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ABSTRACT 
 
The referendum as a means of decision-making was present in various forms in the 
Slovene constitutional order even when Slovenia was still a part of communist 
Yugoslavia, yet neither a constitutional nor a legislative referendum were ever carried 
out in practice (referendums were held only at the local level and in "working" and 
other organisations). Given this total absence of referendum practice in the legislative 
field and the negative experience of referendums from the past, it is clear that a 
referendum democracy has yet to establish itself in Slovenia. 
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Direct Democracy: country-report on Slovenia
Igor Luksic
  
 
Historical Review
The first Slovene experience with referendum goes back to the year 1919. After the end of the First
World War Slovenes joined the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It meant final liberation from
German hegemony and from Austro-Hungarian State. And in this process the new borders between new
south slave state and the Austria had to be establish. The biggest problem in that context was to establish the
state border in the areas that were ethnically mixed between Austrians and Slovenes. Under the provisions
of the peace conference in Paris borders were to be established by the referendum. At the referendum it was
decided that the questionable territory is going to belong to Austria. So, the very first referendum experience
that lies in the Slovene political memory was traumatic.
The basic forms of direct democracy were already present under the previous constitutional order of
Slovenia (within the framework of the former Yugoslavia). The constitutional referendum was first
regulated in Slovenia in the 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. The legislative
referendum was first explicitly regulated with a constitutional law from 1953, although in an indirect
manner it had also been made possible by the 1947 Constitution of the People's Republic of Slovenia. The
popular initiative was introduced to the Slovene constitutional system in 1989 with amendment LXXVI to
the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. All the Slovene constitutions have in some form or another
contained provisions on the right to petition, although before the adoption of the new constitution (1991)
only the 1947 Constitution of the People's Republic of Slovenia had explicitly defined this right as such —
later constitutions did not separately (independently) set out this right but the sense of it was encompassed
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The referendum as a means of decision-making was present in various forms in the Slovene
constitutional order even when Slovenia was still a part of communist Yugoslavia, yet neither a
constitutional nor a legislative referendum were ever carried out in practice (referendums were held only at
the local level and in "working" and other organisations). Given this total absence of referendum practice in
the legislative field and the negative experience of referendums from the past, it is clear that a referendum
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Among the development phases of the constitutional regulation of referendums in the former political
system (within a Yugoslav framework), we should mention first the 1947 Constitution of the People's
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Republic of Slovenia, which referred to the possibility of a referendum that would be called by the
presidium, pursuant to a decision by the Assembly or at the proposal of the government, on matters within
the jurisdiction of the Slovene republic (Article 72).
The constitutional law from 1953, in a separate provision contained in Article 25, stipulated that a law
could be proposed to the electorate for them to decide on it. This legislative referendum could be ante legem
or post legem, but in both cases it was only facultative (it could be proposed by one-fifth of the members of
one of the chambers of the Assembly or by the Executive Council). The decision of the voters was binding
and for two years following the referendum it was not possible to adopt a law or any other act that would be
contrary to the decision taken at the referendum. Pursuant to the constitutional law, more detailed
regulations on referendums were supposed to be set out in a separate law but this was never adopted.
In addition to general provisions on the possibility of exercising self-government by means of a
referendum (Article 50), the 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia also laid down specific
provisions on the legislative referendum (as well as on referendums on other issues and, for the first time, a
constitutional referendum). The legislative referendum was envisaged as being facultative (the Assembly
decided whether to call it) and could be ante legem or post legem. A further continuation from the previous
arrangement lay in the fact that the decision of the voters was binding on the republic's Assembly and that
for two years following the holding of the referendum the Assembly was not able to pass a law or other act
which could be contrary to the result of the referendum.
The legislative referendum as regulated by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia from
1974 did not differ substantially from the previous arrangement. Here again the legislative referendum was
regulated within the framework of common provisions on referendums. It was defined as facultative, ante
legem or post legem, and the referendum result was binding on the Assembly of the republic. Again, a two-
year ban was prescribed on the passing of a law or other act which would be contrary to the result of the
referendum (Article 337).
In 1989 a cluster of constitutional amendments included amendment LXXI to the Slovene constitution of
1974, which augmented the institution of referendums in general, and the legislative referendum in
particular. Among other things, the amendment stipulated that a legislative referendum could be carried out
on the basis of a decision by the Assembly of the republic, and must be carried out if demanded by a certain
number of voters to be determined by law (the constitutional provisions on the outcome of the referendum
being binding and on the two-year ban on the passing of a law or other act that would be contrary to the
result of the referendum remained in force).
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In order to provide a more complete understanding of the (constitutional) development of the referendum
in Slovenia, it should be explained that the two former Yugoslavias (i.e. the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the
post-war communist Yugoslavia), of which Slovenia was a part, were among a number of east European
countries that in this century did not hold a single referendum at the state level. According to the doctrine
that workers should decide by them selves on the conditions of work. Mechanisms of direct democracy were
much more extended on the level of local communities and working organisations.
7 
 Contemporary Slovenia
The contemporary Slovenia was born out of referendum. Slovene referendum (plebiscite) on sovereignty
and independence took place on 23 December 1990. The plebiscite for an independent Slovenia, which gave
to the Slovene parliament and other state organs the authority to legally and politically declare
independence, undoubtedly reflected the genuine will of the majority of the Slovene population. The
plebiscite was the evidence that a referendum democracy in Slovenia is not only possible but is something
that, in certain cases, can be a very beneficial supplement to representative democracy. This applies
primarily to questions relating to Slovenia's vital national interests and which are suitable for putting to a
referendum (e.g. decisions on incorporation in European and other international integration).
8 
 Institutions of direct Democracy in the Slovene constitutional order
Article 3 of the Slovene constitution confers power to the people (the principle of popular sovereignty),
stipulating that citizens shall exercise that power in two ways: directly, and at elections in accordance with
the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial. In addition, the constitution
explicitly provides for certain typical or most important institutions of direct democracy: referendums,
popular initiative and the right to petition.
Pursuant to Article 170 of the constitution and in accordance with the provisions of the LRPI (Law on
Referendum and Popular Initiative), the National Assembly must call a referendum on a constitutional
amendment (constitutional referendum) if such is demanded by no less than thirty deputies (facultative
referendum). A demand for a referendum may be submitted by deputies after the adoption of a constitutional
amendment but before its proclamation in the National Assembly. The National Assembly calls a
referendum no later than seven days after the submission of a demand. An amendment to the constitution is
confirmed at the referendum if a majority of the voters who cast their ballots voted in favour, on the
condition that a majority of all voters took part in the voting. The National Assembly is bound by the result
of the referendum and for two years after the referendum was carried out it may not adopt a constitutional
amendment which would be contrary to that result.
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Article 139 of the constitution stipulates that the municipality, which is the basic unit of local
government in Slovenia, is established in accordance with a referendum held to ascertain the will of the
people in a given area. This referendum on the establishing of municipalities, which is prescribed as
obligatory, is not legally binding on the National Assembly, which, after the referendum has been held,
establishes the municipality and determines its boundaries with a law. This type of referendum, which
therefore serves merely as a guideline (in other words it is a consultative referendum), is set out in detail in
the Law on Referendums for the Establishing of Municipalities.
The next important form of direct democracy provided for by the new constitution is the popular
legislative initiative. A group of not less than five thousand voters may propose the enactment of a law to
the National Assembly (Article 88 of the Constitution), and a group of not less than thirty thousand voters
may propose the initiation of the procedure to amend the constitution (popular constitutional initiative —
Article 168 of the constitution). Pursuant to Article 59 of the LRPI, any voter, political party or other
association of citizens may present an initiative to the electorate for submitting a proposal to begin the
procedure to amend the constitution or enact a law. The signatures from voters in support of the proposal
must be collected within 60 days.
This constitutional arrangement of the popular legislative initiative is clearly inadequate (the same
applies to the constitutional initiative) since the National Assembly (the legislator) can reject a bill proposed
by the voters without any legal sanction. And it can do this as early as the first reading. To a certain extent
this shortcoming is compensated for by the provisions on the legislative referendum in Article 90 of the
constitution, where it is stipulated that such referendum is obligatory in the case of a referendum on a
popular (legislative) initiative (second paragraph of Article 90). But the situation under Article 90 is not
essentially linked with the provision contained in Article 88 of the constitution because in accordance with
Article 90 a demand must be made by 40,000 voters for the obligatory calling of a legislative referendum
and, pursuant to the LRPI, an additional condition is that in this case the bill to which the demand relates
must be submitted before the collection of voters' signatures in support of the demand for the calling of a
legislative referendum begins. Therefore whenever the National Assembly intends to reject their legislative
initiative under Article 88 of the constitution, five thousand voters can, pursuant to Article 90 of the
constitution and the provisions of the LRPI, announce the collection of 40,000 signatures in support of the
lodging of a demand for a referendum, thereby keeping the proposed law in the legislative procedure
(provided, of course, that the collection of signatures is successful).
The constitution also sets out the right to petition. Each citizen has the right to present petitions and
other initiatives of a general nature (Article 45 of the constitution). Citizens may therefore address various
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complaints, proposals, demands, initiatives, requests, etc, to parliament and other organs of power, although
the constitution does not stipulate that such state organs are obliged to reply to them.
It is also worth mentioning that through the principle of the autonomy of local government (Article 9) or
the framework regulation of local government (Articles 138-144), the constitution also enables various
forms of direct democracy at the local level. Article 44 of the Law on Local Government sets out three
ways in which citizens participate directly in decision-making in the municipality: citizens' assembly,
referendum and popular initiative. A citizens' assembly may be called for the entire municipality or for a
particular part of it. It is called by the mayor at his or her own initiative, at the initiative of the municipal
council or at the demand of five per cent of the voters in the municipality or in a part of the municipality as
determined by its statute (Article 45 of the law). The municipal council may call a referendum at its own
initiative on any of its acts or other decision, and must call a referendum if such is demanded by not less
than 10 per cent of the voters in the municipality. All citizens who are entitled to vote for members of the
municipal council have the right to vote at a referendum. A decision is passed at a referendum if more than
half the people who voted cast their ballots in favour (Article 46). In addition to this type of referendum, the
municipal council or the mayor may call a consultative referendum on specific issues of general importance
within the competence of the municipality, but the municipal authorities are not bound by the result of such
a referendum (Article 47). The provisions on the popular initiative are set out in Article 48 of the law,
which determines that not less than five per cent of the voters in a municipality may demand the passing or
abrogation of a general act or other decision within the competence of the municipal council or other
municipal bodies. The body to which the demand is addressed must decide on it within a time limit set by
the statute of the municipality, which may not be longer than three months.
Articles 26 to 29 of the LRPI contain special provisions on the consultative referendum, which the
constitution does not explicitly prescribe but which it does not prevent either. This type of referendum may
only be called by the National Assembly, and it may do so on issues within its competence which are of
general public importance. The National Assembly may call a consultative referendum for the entire
territory of the state or for a specific, narrower area for matters concerning only the inhabitants of such
narrower area. The National Assembly may call a consultative referendum before making its final decision
on a specific issue but is not bound by the result.
9 
 The legislative referendum
The constitution regulates the legislative referendum in Article 90, which stipulates that the National
Assembly may call a referendum on any issue which is the subject of regulation by law and that the National
Assembly is bound by the result of such a referendum. The National Assembly may call a legislative
referendum at its own initiative but must call such a referendum if it is demanded by no less than one-third
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(i.e. a minimum of thirty) of all elected deputies, by the National Council (which can only adopt such a
demand by majority vote of all members — Article 99 of the constitution)24 or by forty thousand voters.
The constitution therefore sets out a facultative referendum. All citizens who are eligible to vote generally
have the right to vote at a referendum. Any proposal put to a referendum is deemed to have been accepted if
a simple majority of voters voting at the referendum vote in favour of it.
The fifth paragraph of Article 90 of the constitution stipulates separately that the procedures for holding
referendums shall be regulated by a law passed by a two-thirds majority of those deputies present and
voting. The Law on Referendum and Popular Initiative was passed by the two-third majority of votes by
Slovene Parliament in 1994. The LRPI regulates the Referendum on constitutional changes, legislative
referendum and consultative referendum on the questions under the jurisdiction of the National Assembly as
well as the popular initiative. Legislative referendum, defined by the LRPI, is either preliminary or
subsequent. On the referendum the voters either express their will about the questions that are yet to be
regulated by the law, either they decide about the confirmation of the law that was already passed by the
National Assembly.
A referendum may be called on each and every issue which is the subject of regulation by law (in other
words the constitution does not stipulate that a referendum be called on a law as a whole). It should be said
that in modern legal systems the rights and obligations of subjects are generally regulated by law.
Furthermore, nowadays almost every social issue in a given circumstance can be cause for such a level of
potential or actual conflict that it can be considered a statutory matter (except for those relations or rights
and obligations which, because of their nature, are entirely removed from regulation by law or which are
explicitly reserved for constitutional regulation).
The special problem is the estimation of the legal and statutory  adequacy in the case of a preliminary
legislative referendum. Here the statutory matter is initially defined by the qualified proposers of the
referendum, and this is a process in which the voters are either directly or indirectly involved. If, for
instance, judging that an issue does not involve a statutory matter, the National Assembly does not call a
referendum which has been proposed by the voters, the National Council or thirty deputies, it would cause
tensions and complications. Here the Constitutional Court can prevent potential abuse of legal (statutory)
form by ruling, in accordance with its constitutional and legal competences, that a law or the content of a
demand for a law to be adopted or amended at a referendum are not in accordance with the constitution. Yet
even the Constitutional Court is operating in something of a void here because the constitution does not
contain precise instructions or criteria for defining a statutory matter as such.
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: 
 Practice of referendum in decision making in contemporary Slovenia
First we should mention that the procedure (decision on whether a referendum proposal involve a
statutory matter) that concerns the voter’s request proved to be very crucial in Slovene referendum practice.
According to the LRPI initiator addresses the request of the voters to the President of the National
Assembly. Request has to be based on two hundred valid signatures of the voters. The President of the
National Assembly defines the time limits in which initiator has to collect forty thousand signatures.
National Assembly has also right to estimate the adequacy of the request. It has two mechanisms to prevent
the abuse of referendum or to «obstruct» the initiative. It can decide that the request is not adequately
formulate, so the initiator has to change or elucidate the referendum question. Or, National Assembly might
asses that the initiative is not in accordance with the Constitution. In that case it demands from the
Constitutional Court to review the formulated referendum question.
Slovene experience knows some cases in which initiatives were blockaded by mechanisms mentioned
above. There are three significant examples of referendum initiatives that were prevented in such a manner.
The first was the referendum initiative on the question of citizenship. It was an initiative of two right-wing
representatives (Štefan Matuš, Marjan Poljšak) who wanted the referendum on suppression of citizenship to
all those who obtained it in accordance with the article forty of the Law on Citizenship. The initiative aimed
at citizens that are ethnically non-Slovenes (of other ex-Yugoslavia’s ethnic origin). On the initiative of the
National Assembly, Constitutional Court ruled out (U-I-266/95) that the content of the request is non-
constitutional. Such a decision was of course justified because democracy, democratic rights and citizenship
are universal and not ethnic concepts.
The second was the case of referendum initiative on the denationalisation. United List of Social
Democrats tried to formulate a referendum initiative that would change the course of denationalisation
process. The question of denationalisation in contemporary Slovenia is the prime conceptual question
defines the Slovene social organisation. United List tried to prevent the land, forests and other property that
have the feudal or church origin to be given back to old owners (feudal barons and Catholic Church). The
referendum question also contained the notion of property maximum that can be given back in the process of
denationalisation. United List gathered more than 43000 signatures. In the mean time one third of deputies
in the National Assembly passed the request to evaluate the accordance of the referendum initiative with the
Slovene Constitution. The Constitutional Court pre-formulated the referendum question by the constitutional
judgement (U-I-121/97) that the Church is exempted from the category of feudal property.  Because of that
fact United List backed from the initiative. This case shows that the issue of referendum can go far beyond
obligations and rights of subjects. It might also be included in the process of conceptual definition of the
social organisation. Referendum after all has eminent political role.
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The third case was the initiative of the movement of 23-th of December. With their initiative they tried to
blockade the adoption of Associational agreement in the Slovene National Assembly. The initiative was
efficiently blockaded with the «tactic of delay» and administrative obstacles in the National Assembly. This
case shows that the initiatives that are to the contrary with the broad national consensus are destined to
failure.
In all three cases the Slovene Constitutional Court established itself as the crucial instance in the
evaluation of the legal and statutory matters of proposed preliminary referendum. If we regard it politically,
the Slovene cases of referendum (successful or not) reveals that Slovene Constitutional Court established
itself not just as legal but also as an important political subject. In the way that it actively intervenes in the
political reality, it takes side and by this actively participate in the process of defining the alternatives of
organisation of life, production and reproduction. In short it has all features of the political subject.
; 
 Successful cases of legislative referendum in Slovenia
Slovene practice of direct democracy has so far only three «successful» cases. Also because of above
mentioned mechanisms that filter initiatives there were only three cases of realised referendums on the
national level.
a) The Referendum on the voting system
The most exposed and ambivalent case of Slovene referendum practice was the referendum on the voting
system. This case really flurried the political scene in Slovenia. In all its complexity it is the prototype of
referendum practice and as such it exposes the referendum as the relation between different political
subjects and consequently it enables us to determine the Slovene political subject as it was established after
the democratisation and establishment of the new sovereign State.
This case was marked by a real referendum race. On 12 April 1996 the Social Democratic Party of
Slovenia lodged an initiative to voters to gain support for their demand for the calling of a preliminary
legislative referendum on certain questions which should be regulated by a proposed Law on Amendments
and Supplements to the Law on Elections to the National Assembly. At the referendum it was proposed that
voters would decide on replacing the current proportional system with a two-round majority voting system.
A few days later, on 17 April, a group of thirty-five deputies submitted a demand for the calling of a
preliminary legislative referendum in respect of the same law, but with a quite different referendum
question. They would have the electorate deciding merely on certain changes (minor "corrections") to the
current proportional electoral system which would not make significant amendments to the voting system
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itself. On that same day, about an hour later, the National Council also lodged a demand for a preliminary
legislative referendum, proposing that the electorate adopt some sort of intermediate solution, i.e. the
introduction of a combined proportional-majority electoral system. The case was and still is completely
invested with the political interests and conflicts that give shape to the Slovene political space in last ten
years. Subjects that proposed referendum initiative were Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, National
Assembly deputies and National Council. Behind the initiative of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia
was the calculation of public mobilisation for the party politics, the aspiration to the hegemonic position in
the right-wing bloc (so called «spring» bloc) and the count that the majority voting system would change the
political equilibrium in favour of the spring bloc in which Social Democratic Party of Slovenia seek to have
the hegemonic position.
Other two protagonist, thirty-five National Assembly deputies and National Council tried to prevent
radical changes of the voting system. The establishment of the majority voting system would mean the
polarisation of the political space into two blocs. While the right-wing bloc (Catholic) already exists, at the
symbolic level (anti communism, attachment to the Catholic Church) but also at the level of the concrete
political cooperation and commitment to return to the power, they had after the first democratic elections,
there is no such thing as the homogenous left-wing bloc. Even potentially, there is no moral and political
force that would keep this bloc together (as the Catholic Church for the right-wing bloc) except the defence
of a laic state. Shortly, given political situation, relation and equilibrium of power between major political
forces in Slovenia, prescribed the respective positions in the case of Referendum on the voting system.
The Referendum on the voting system took place in December 1996. Three referendum questions were
formulated. The question of National Council (combination of proportional and majority voting system), the
question of Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (two round majority system) and the question of the thirty-
five National Assembly deputies (pure proportional system modelled on the Israel experience). At the
referendum no proposition obtained more than fifty percents of all votes. According to the Act on the
Manner of Voting and on the Establishment of Voting Results at the Referendum on the Electoral System
that was passed by the National Assembly, no referendum proposition was accepted. Than entered in the
scene the new subject, the Constitutional Court to which Social Democratic Party of Slovenia addressed a
constitutional complaint. Constitutional Court accepted very controversial rule. In its judgement  (U-I-12/97)
it ordered to the National Assembly to pass the law on the voting system that would be in accordance with
the referendum decision, which, according to the Constitutional Court decided in favour of the majority
voting system (the proposal of Social Democratic Party of Slovenia).
Paragraph 90 of Slovene Constitution says that the proposition on the referendum is adopted if majority
of those who voted were in favour of the proposition. The problem was that there were three proposals and
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none of them obtained the majority of voters. The Constitutional Court that the correct interpretation of the
above mentioned Act is that in the case of more proposals (votes are split) the majority of voters concern
every proposal individually. The proposal of Social Democratic Party of Slovenia obtained 44.5% of all
votes, but taking individually and separately in the percent portion the same proposal obtained 65% votes in
favour and 35% against. According to many, by such acrobatic mathematical operation the Constitutional
Court made, once already death proposal, resuscitated. (Krivic, separate opinion)
Such a decision of the Constitutional Court was really controversial. The mobilisation of voters by the
principal political subjects was conditioned by the constitutional stipulation that proposal is adopted only
when the majority of all voters is in favour of one of propositions. That is why the referendum turnout was
poor (about 35%) and there was no significant mobilisation of the electorate in favour of proportional
(existing) voting system.
The case of Referendum on the voting system shows us that referendum in Slovene political practice has
not so much the role of mechanism that allows to articulate and express the peoples will, but is more or less
the instrument that is subjected to different manipulations in the power dynamics between different subjects,
that are not the subjects of direct democracy. More precisely it is used as a weapon in the struggle for power
in the process of (re)equilibration of the power relations in the social and political sphere.
b) The Referendum on the question of financing the construction of the power plant in Zasavje.
The last example of the populist and anti-popular (mis)use of referendum is the case of referendum on
the question of financing (the proposed financial construction by the government) the thermoelectric power
station in Trbovlje. It was more farce than the real expression of the peoples will. The voting turnout was
low, around 28 percent of voters and almost 80 percent voted against the proposed financial construction.
The question that is raised bay this case is either it is appropriate to decide on such a issue by the
referendum. It is highly professional question in the first place. Then, the decision really touched only the
population of concerned region (the region of Zasavje has huge economic and social problems) and that
population was in majority for the proposed construction. Legally, the question of financing the construction
of power plant can be subjected to the examination of people’s will by referendum. The draft of the law on
financial construction was already in the procedure, it has already passed the second reading. So legally the
question is not disputable. But looking at the case politically, it was more a luxurious episode of the power
struggle between position and opposition, even the personal war between leading figures in Slovene politics.
Whole story happened on the premises of governments politics of clientelism and the opposition politics of
populist mobilisation. Latter (opposition parties from the right-wing bloc Christian democrats and Social
democrats and People’s part, which is in the governing opposition) tried to show through the referendum
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process, that the left-wing bloc (liberal-democrats and United List) are reactionary in the question of
development. Really far away from the process of articulation and expression of the alternatives of live,
production and reproduction, the process of articulation and expression of the peoples will. On the
Referendum the government’s plans failed, but in reality it was the Referendum it self that failed.
c) The Investigative Referendums on the Municipalities
The whole Reform of local self-government in Slovenia was subjected to the division of the influence
between political parties and political blocs. Under the ideology of adapting to the European standard the
process of «feudalisation» took place. The formula was more or less «one parish, one municipality». The
ideological control was prior to municipality’s functioning and their autonomy.
The Case of Investigative Referendums on the Municipalities was subjected to the  regulations by the
special law. Referendum was called by the National Assembly in the cases were the desires of local
population was not in accordance with the newly defined municipalities. So this case was not a nation wide.
Nevertheless it is important for our analysis of referendum practice in Slovenia, because it clearly exposes
the main political subjects, actors and more theoretically speaking, it helps us to determine through the
analysis of relation of power between those subjects and actors, the type and main contours of political
subject in contemporary Slovenia.
In the referendum process, it was the case of municipality Koper, that was the most controversial case
and as such the most instructive one. There was a referendum about the integrity (against division) of
respective municipality. The two-third majority of electorate was in favour of integral municipality. In that
process Danijel Starman  addressed the initiative to Slovene Constitutional Court to review the accordance
of the existing integral municipality of Koper with the Slovene constitutional order. Constitutional Court
judged (U-I-301/98) on the basis of its two earlier judgements (U-I-90/94 and U-I-183/94), which
established that the existing municipality of Koper is territorially too big, has too much inhabitants
settlements and is therefor too heterogeneous and as such is not in accordance with the constitutional order.
After this, the municipality of Koper called its own referendum on which the members of community again
expressed their majority will to live in existing municipality. But Constitutional Court stayed determined.
The whole story around municipality of Koper is not over yet.
What is extremely important in the case of municipality of Koper is the fact that the will of skilful lawyer
is more important then the will that is expressed by the majority of voters at the referendum. Theoretically it
means that legal subject and the subject of direct democracy can be antagonistic and that modern
democracies favours the legal subject.
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< 
 Brief assessment of political aspects of the Slovene referendum practice
Aftermath the king’s head was chopped of in political theory (Foucault 1991), the only possible political
analysis is the analysis of the nature and acts of specific subject, instead of their deduction in a general
theory of subject (Rancière 1998, 13). If we would like to politically analyse the referendum experience, we
have to proceed by the analysis of the specific political subjects. The specific political subject that is the
carrier of the practice of direct democracy is the subject of direct democracy, historically defined and active.
If we assess the practice and subject of direct democracy through instrument of Referendum in Slovene
democracy in last 10 years, we can assume that:
Direct democracy, its practice, is subordinate to indirect democracy. Referendum and referendum
initiatives are to often manipulated by the subjects of indirect democracy (political parties)
Constitutive power of the people that has its expression in referendum and popular initiative is secondary
to the once established institutions and norms of democratic regime.
The subject of direct democracy and the legal subject are antagonistic. In current democracies the subject
of direct democracy (articulation and expression of popular will) is inferior to the legal subject
In present days democracies, and it is evident in the case of Slovenia, subject of direct democracy is very
weak. In modern democracies homogenous role is played by the legal subject and subject of indirect
democracy.
Above listed findings is not something particularly unusual or surprising. Direct democracy has its
modern conceptualisation in the thought of Rousseau. Modern democracies (developed in the West after the
Second World War and then expanded to the Eastern Europe) are founded in the strong liberal consensus
(Hobbes and successors). The relation between private and public, who is decisive in the determination of
political subject, is conceptualised in a complete different manner. For illustration let us see the following
quotation from Rousseau’s Social Contract: »As soon as public service cease to be the main business of
citizens, and they prefer to serve with their purses rather than with their persons, the state is already on the
brink of ruin. Is it necessary to go forth to war? They hire troops and remain at home. Is it necessary to take
counsel? They appoint deputies and remain at home. By dint of laziness and money, they end by having
mercenaries to enslave their country, and representative to sell it.« (Rousseau 1953, 102)
Obviously, in liberal democratic regimes the institutions of direct democracy have a secondary role.
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This does not mean that the institutions of direct democracy, namely of referendum, are politically
insignificant. In the Slovene case it is obvious that referendum has meaning that goes beyond the simple
mechanism of manipulation and ideological legitimisation. In its role in the power struggle it can assume the
constitutive status, that is, it has a potential to change irreversibly the content of socio-political relations.
The contemporary Slovene State was founded in an act of expression of popular will.
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